Employers Cannot Take A “See No Evil, Hear No Evil” Strategy Towards Racial Harassment
Having represented employment discrimination victims for more than twenty years, our race discrimination lawyers in Sumter County, Florida know that many employers require workers to endure racial harassment as a condition of their employment. Although required by federal employment discrimination law to protect employees from workplace racial harassment, in far too many cases employers tolerate, if not condone, workplace racial harassment. In this article, our race discrimination lawyers in Sumter County, Florida explain how the decision in Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corporation, 750 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2014) shows that employers are forbidden from adopting a “see no evil, hear no evil” strategy when they know or should have known of racial harassment in the workplace.
Protection From Racial Harassment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) protects employees from discrimination on the basis of race. Under well-established law, racial harassment is a form of race discrimination prohibited by Title VII. To violate Title VII’s prohibition against race discrimination, racial harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create a hostile working environment.
Title VII imposes a remedial obligation on employers once they know or should know of racial harassment in the workplace. An employer has actual knowledge of racial harassment when the victim complains to management. An employer has constructive knowledge of racial harassment when the harassment is so severe or pervasive that the employer should have known of the harassment. To comply with Title VII’s remedial obligation, an employer must take prompt and effective remedial action to stop the racial harassment and prevent the racial harassment from recurring. If the employer takes no remedial obligation, or the remedial action does not stop the racial harassment, the employer is liable under Title VII for creating and maintaining a racial hostile working environment.
Racial Hostile Work Environment Lawsuit
In Freeman, a woman named Freeman brought a racial harassment lawsuit against her former employer, Dal-Tile Corporation (“Dal-Tile”), pursuant to Title VII. Freeman alleges that, during her employment Dal-Tile, she was racially harassed in violation of Title VII.
Freeman, who is African-American, was employed by Dal-Tile as a customer service representative. Freeman’s racial harassment claim involves the behavior of an employee, Koester, who worked for a client, Vostone, Inc. (“Vostone”) of Dal-Tile. A significant percentage of Vostone’s business involved working with Dal-Tile. Freeman usually interacted with Koester more than once a day while he was conducting business with Dal-Tile on behalf of Vostone.
In June 2009, Koester called Freeman about covering a customer appointment for him because he had been partying the night before. During the telephone call, Koester allegedly used a racial slur. Freeman told an assistant manager, Wrenn, about Koester’s alleged racial comment that same day. According to Freeman, Wrenn just “scoffed and shook her head and put her head back down and continued on with trying to pick nail polish off of her nails.” Freeman also reported the racial slur to one of the co-owners of Vostone. The co-owner allegedly laughed and said: “You got to admit that’s kind of funny, just do what I do and hit him because he’s a [jerk.].”
Subsequently, in July 2009, Koester called Dal-Tile’s general office line, and Freeman answered the phone. During this telephone call, Koester allegedly made another racial comment. Freeman promptly told Wrenn about Koester’s comment, but Wrenn appeared disinterested and continued a conversation that she had been having with some other co-workers.
In addition to these specific incidents, Freeman and other co-workers also testified generally about Koester’s inappropriate racial remarks. For example, Koester allegedly made racial comments when talking to female employees. One employee testified that Koester used racial language every day he came into the office. Another employee testified that Koester used racial language in the office. Koester himself testified that he made comments that were “maybe racially inappropriate.”
Following the incident in July 2009, Freeman reported Koester’s remarks to a human resources employee, Diksa, after Wrenn ignored her complaint. Diksa initially promised Koester that he would be permanently banned from the office. However, Dal-Tile lifted the ban and instead prohibited Koester from communicating with Freeman. He was allowed on the premises but had to coordinate all on-site meetings through Wrenn.
Freeman was so upset about the prospect of being forced to interact with Koester that she took a medical leave of absence from September 2009 until November 2009. During this time, Freeman received treatment for depression and anxiety. In December 2009, Freeman resigned her employment with Dal-Tile. Freeman testified that she resigned because the depression and anxiety became too much for her; she was constantly worried she would encounter Koester at work.
Should Have Known Of Racial Harassment
The trial court dismissed Freeman’s racial harassment claim. In doing so, the trial court concluded that Dal-Tile did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the racial harassment because Freeman’s “statements” to Wrenn did not constitute a racial harassment complaint, “either formal or informal.” On appeal, the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated Freeman’s racial harassment claim.
Unlike the reversed trial court, the Fourth Circuit found that Dal-Tile had actual knowledge of the racial harassment because Freeman’s “statements” to Wrenn constituted racial harassment complaints. Unlike the reversed trial court, the court of appeals also considered whether Dal-Tile had constructive knowledge of the racial harassment. In resolving this issue, the appellate court determined that “even if Wrenn did not have actual knowledge of the racial harassment,” Wrenn, “at the very least should have known” because Wrenn “was aware of Koester’s on-going inappropriate behavior and comments, had received several complaints about the harassing incidents from Freeman,” and “knew” that “incendiary” racial comments “had been used in the presence of a black, female employee.” “An employer,” the court of appeals explained, “cannot avoid Title VII liability by adopting a ‘see no evil, hear no evil’ strategy.’ ” Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “a reasonable jury could find that Dal-Tile knew, or at the very least, should have known, of Koester’s harassment.”
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Sumter County Race Discrimination Lawyers
Based in Ocala, Florida and representing workers throughout Florida, our race discrimination attorneys in Sumter County, Florida have litigated racial discrimination cases in Florida courts for more than two decades. If you have experienced workplace racial harassment or have questions about an employer’s obligation to protect you from workplace racial harassment, please contact our office for a free consultation with our racial discrimination lawyers in Sumter County, Florida. Our employee rights law firm takes race discrimination cases on a contingency fee basis. This means that there are no attorney’s fees incurred unless there is a recovery, and our attorney’s fees come solely from the monetary award that you recover.