What Is Unlawful Discrimination Based On Sex Stereotyping?
Although now rarely proffered as an explicit reason for an employment decision, our employment discrimination lawyers in Marion County, Florida have learned, employers continue to make employment decisions based on sex stereotyping. “In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,” as the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) explained, “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” In applying Supreme Court precedent, courts have long held that federal employment discrimination law prohibits employers from making employment decisions based on a sex stereotype.
An employment decision based on a sex stereotype is an unlawful employment decision because the employment decision is based on an employee’s sex. Remarks by managers or supervisors manifesting or reflecting sex stereotyping are evidence that an employment decision was based on a sex stereotype and, thus, are evidence of an unlawful sex-based employment decision. In this article, our employment discrimination lawyers in Marion County, Florida explain how the alleged facts in Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2009) are illustrative of an employment decision based on sex stereotyping.
Employment Discrimination Lawsuit
In that case, a man named Sassaman brought an employment discrimination lawsuit against his former employer, the Dutchess County Board of Elections (“DCBE”), pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex. Sassaman alleges that he was pressured into resigning because of a sex stereotype regarding the propensity of men to sexually harass their female co-workers.
In 2003, Sassaman began working for the DCBE as an Elections Administrator. In this position, Sassaman was supervised by the Republican Commissioner of the Board (the “Commissioner”). In early 2005, the Commission informed Sassaman that a co-worker, Brant, had complained about Sassaman allegedly “harassing and stalking her.” The Commissioner told Sassaman that Brant claimed to fear Sassaman and had stayed out of the officer for that reason. Sassaman was suspended from work with pay. On March 10, 2005, Brant submitted a written complaint describing Sassaman’s alleged conduct. The Commissioner referred Brant’s complaint to the Sheriff’s Office. The Commissioner, however, did not refer Brant’s complaint for an internal investigation.
Propensity Of Men Sexually Harass
Officers from the Sheriff’s Office interviewed Brant and Sassaman. During his interview, Sassaman denied ever calling Brant at home or sending her notes. When pressed further, Sassaman admitted that he had both called Brant at home and sent her at least one note. Sassaman attributed the discrepancy between his initial responses and subsequent admissions to his belief that “he was being interviewed about sexual harassment and he never called or wrote a note that could reasonably be considered sexually harassing. Upon completing the investigation, the Sheriff’s Office concluded, in a report dated March 16, 2005, “At this time insufficient evidence exists to support any type of criminal charges.”
While the matter was being investigated by the Sherrif’s Office, Sassaman met with the Commissioner twice. According to Sassaman, these meetings were brief and held at a local diner. Shortly thereafter, Sassaman retained counsel, who the participated in two more meetings with the Commissioner.
On March 21, 2005, the Commissioner informed Sassaman by telephone that he would be terminated unless he chose to resign. According to Sassaman, the Commissioner defended his decision by explaining, “I really don’t have any choice. [Brant] knows a lot of attorneys; I’m afraid she’ll sue me. And besides you probably did what she said you did because you’re male and nobody would believe you anyway.”
Cannot Justify Decision Based On Sex Stereotyping
The trial court dismissed Sassaman’s sex discrimination claim. The district court concluded that the comments attributed to the Commissioner were “ambiguous” and incapable of “demonstrating action gender stereotyping, and reasoned that “such a viewpoint, even if held, would not necessarily taint an employment decision to respond to a harassment complaint.” On appeal, the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated Sassaman’s sex discrimination claim.
Unlike the reversed the trial court, the Second Circuit observed that “Title VII suits often require a court or jury to consider whether an employer’s response to an allegation of discrimination itself constitutes evidence of discrimination or liability for discrimination.” “The failure of an employer to conduct an adequate investigation or to undertake an appropriate response,” the appellate further observed, “can constitute evidence in support of a Title VII plaintiff’s allegations.” “For that reason,” the court of appeals pointed out, “an employer [in the Title VII context] must consider not only the behavior of the alleged offender, but also the response, if any, of its managers.”
“[W]hen an employer considers how to respond to an employee’s allegation of discrimination,” the Second Circuit explained, “it may take into account the risk that the complaining employee might file an action against the employer.” However, the court of appeals determined, “an employer may not rely on an alleged fear of a lawsuit as a reason to shortcut its investigation of harassment and to justify an employment decision adverse to the putative harasser that in itself violates Title VII.” “Just as the lack of an investigation of a reported claim of harassment may factor into the determination of an employer’s liability for discrimination against the complainant,” the appellate court concluded, “so too may it indicate discrimination by an employer whose adverse determination against the putative harasser otherwise bears indicia of prohibited discrimination.”
Evidence Of Impermissible Sex Stereotyping
Applying these principles, the Second Circuit found that “a reasonable jury could infer from the inadequacy of [the DCBE’s] investigation, if proven, that [the DCBE] relied solely on a sex stereotype, and clearly not on the outcome of a reasonable investigation undertaken in response to their fear of a lawsuit, as the basis for the decision to pressure Sassaman to resign.” In applying these principles, the Second Circuit further found that the Commissioner’s alleged “comment on the propensity of men to engage in sexual harassment and [the DCBE’s] arguable failure to investigate properly the charges of sexual harassment lodged against Sassaman, was sufficient to infer discriminatory intent.” In other words, the Second Circuit explained, “a reasonable jury could infer discrimination based on sex stereotyping in light of Sassaman’s evidence that his supervisor believed that men have a propensity to commit sexual harassment and [the DCBE’s] arguable failure to investigate properly the charges of sexual harassment lodged against Sassaman.”
Marion County, FL Discrimination Lawyers
Based in Ocala, Florida and representing workers throughout Florida, our employment discrimination lawyers in Marion County, Florida have fought for the rights of employment discrimination victims for more than twenty years. If you have endured sex discrimination in the workplace or have questions about your rights as a sex discrimination victim, please contact our office for a free consultation with our employment discrimination lawyers in Marion County, Florida. Our employee rights law firm takes employment discrimination cases on a contingency fee basis. This means that there are no attorney’s fees incurred unless there is a recovery, and our attorney’s fees come solely from the monetary award that you recover.